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BUFPALO LAW REVIEW
United States v. Pacific Railroad, supra, said: "The Government cannot be charged
for injuries to, or destruction of, private property caused by military operations of
armies in the field, or measures taken for their safety and efficiency-." (Italics
supplied) (p. 239).
The language of the Congressional cases and that of the Supreme Court in
the Pacific Railroad case shows the test there employed to be substantially at
odds with the test set out in the Grant case and adhered to by the Majority in the
instant case. The precedent-value of either line of reasoning is relatively weak,
since military destruction of American citizens' property is a novel fact situation
in our law, and cases concerned with this issue have been rarely litigated.
The facts of the principle case show that the approach of Japanese forces
necessitated a military decision. The choice was to stay and fight or retreat. Had
the decision been to fight, and during the battle had the property in question been
destroyed, no compensation would be required. Retreat was the wiser alternative,
and as a part of this maneuver the oil was destroyed. The Fifth Amendmen should
not be applied without regard for the realities of the situation under which the
alleged taking occurred. The circumstances here involved reveal that Plaintiffs
property was not taken for any public benefit but was destroyed as a result of a
hostile engagement between our forces and those of the enemy.
Neil R. Farmelo
ADMIRALTY-CONTRIBUTION DENIED IN NON-COLLISION CASE
Libellant, a shipfitter's employee was injured through the joint negligence of
his employer and the owner of the ship on which he was working. Libellant sued
the shipowners who sought contribution from the shipfitting company. The trial
judge refused to follow a jury finding of comparative negligence but held the
shipfitting company liable for contribution to the ektent of one half of libellant's
total injuries. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn, 89 F. Supp. 765 (E. D. Penn. 1950). The
Court of Appeals upheld the right to contribution but modified the amount libel-
lant could recover to a sum that he would have received if he had elected to sue
under the Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Act, 44 Stat. 1424 U. S. C. A.
Sec. 901, Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 187 F. 2d 403 3rd Cir. 1951).
The Supreme Court through Justice Black (7-2) denied the right to con-
tribution, finding that congressional action would be the appropriate way to create
that remedy, in view of the great amount of admiralty legislation. Halcyon Lines
v. Haenn, 72 S. Ct. 277 (1951).
The common law rule is that joint tortfeasors are not entitled to contribu-
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tion. Union Stockyards Co. of Omaha v. Chicago B & Q R Co., 196 U. S. 217
(1904). Choice of defendant rests with the plaintiff. Village of Portland v.
Citizens Tel. Co., 206 Mich. 632, 173 N. W. 382 (1919). See Prosser, Torts p.
1114 (1915). F. James, Contribution, a Pragmatic Criticism, 54 Harvard L. Rev.
1156 (1941). The gross inequity resulting in placing the just burden of many on
one defendant has prompted several states to adopt a uniform contribution among
tortfeasors law. See Uniform Laws Annotated VOL IX, p. 160, Gregory, Con-
tribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, A Defense, 54 Harvard L. R. 11-70 (1941).
The Admiralty rule, as old as the pre-Hanseatic laws of Wisby in the 13th
century, is that in collisions at sea if both ships are at fault the total damages are
divided equally. The Calypso, 166 Eng. Rep. 1000, Swab. 29 (1856). This is
also the American rule. The Sapphire, 87 U. S. 164 (1871), The North Star, 106
LT. S. 17 (1882). See also Robinson, Admiralty, 2d edition, p. 319 (1901),
Knight, Modern Seamanship, 11th edition, p. 474 (1945). This rule was modi-
fied by certain continental nations and England at the 3rd International Diploma-
tic Conference on Maritime law in Brussels in 1910. At that time a proportional
method of division of damages was adopted relative to the degrees of negligence
of the parties. See for text: Supplement 4, American Journal of International
Law 1910, p. 121.
The American rule provides that in a collision caused through fault of both,
the joint wrongdoers each pay half of the damages caused to innocent third
parties. The North Star, supra, The Chattahoochee, 173 U. S. 540 (1899). Vari-
ous federal decisions have carried this "constructive contribution" into the field of
non-collision cases. Thus in The Tampico, 45 F. Supp. 174 (S. D. N. Y. 1942)
the court allowed contribution from libellant's employer to a barge owner to
the extent of one half, in a non-collision case. Semble; U. S. v. Rothchild Inter-
national Stevedore Co., 182 F. 2d 181 (9 Cir. 1950). Spaulding v. Parry Naviga-
ton Co., 90 F. Supp. 569 (S. D. N. Y. 1950) rev'd on other grounds, 187 F. 2d
257 (2d Cir. 1951), Barbarino v. Stanhope S. S. Co., 181 F. 2d 553, 555 (2d
Cir. 1945) where Judge Learned Hand pointedly refused to recognize the dis-
tinction between collision and non-collision cases. See also American Stevedores
Inc. v. Porello, 330 U. S. 447, 458 (1947).
Justice Black in the principle case admits that Admiralty courts have been
"freer than common law courts in fashioning rules," and he states that the equal
division rule would be used in the instant case if the "ends of justice" de-
manded. See 6 NACCA L. J. 31, (1941), Morrison, The Remedial Powers of
the Admiralty, 43 Yale L J. 1 (1933). It is clear as Justices Reed and Burton
indicate by their dissent that where both parties are negligent each owner or
underwriter should bear his fair share of the burden of damages. To allow equal
division in non-collision cases would be no startling judicial legislation. The
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Supreme Court in the past has allowed the equal division rule in collision cases
despite a statute limiting the liability of one of the negligent parties. See The
Chattahoochee, supra; The Harter Act, 27 Stat. 445, 446 U. S. C. Sec. 190-195.
As the Court said in The Tampico, supra "in reason and principle collision cases
point the way." justice Holmes, confronted with a similar argument that an
expansion in admiralty law should be left to the Congress replied: "It would be
a mere historical anomaly if admiralty courts were not free to work out their
own systems and to finish the adjustment of maritime rights and liabilities." Erie
Ry. Co. v. Erie Transportation Co., 204 U. S. 220, 225 (1907).
Daniel T. Roach
EVIDENCE-WIRE RECORDINGS OF CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE HELD INADMISSABLE
The plaintiff had induced his son to make a wire recording of an argument
between plaintiff and his wife while they were alone in their common bedroom.
Held: Admission of the recording in divorce proceedings brought by plaintiff
against his wife was error because the status of the parties and the confidential
nature of the communication made it privileged, Hunter v. Hunter 169 Pa. Super.
498, 83 A (2d) 401 (1951).
Although the absolute common law prohibition, Davis v Dinwoody 4T. R.
678, 100 Eng. Rep. 1241 (1792), against the use of testimony of one spouse in
the cause of the other, whether it be hostile or helpful, has been to a large extent
abrogated in this country by statute, New York Civil Practice Act §346, 28 Pur-
don's Pa. Stats. §317, and by decisional law, Funk -v. U. S. 290 U. S. 371 (1933),
the privilege attached to confidential communications between husband and wife
still persists, Wolfle v. U. S. 291 U. S. 7 (1934), New York Civil Practice Act
§349, New York Penal Law §2449, 28 Purdon's Pa. Stats. §316.
The privilege relates to either the written or spoken word but is applicable
only where the communication is confidential due to its nature, Seitz v. Seitz 170
Pa. 71, 32 Ad. 578 (1887), Parkhurst v. Berdell 110 N. Y. 386, 18 N. E. 123
(1888) and is made in the absence of third persons, People v. Lewis 62 Hun
622, 16 N. Y. Supp (Sup. Ct. 1st Dept. 1891).
The reason for the privilege is the preservation of conjugal unity. Therefore,
the privilege acts as a bar available only to one spouse against testimony by the
other, and does not prevent the admission into evidence of conversations over-
heard, Commonwealth v. Wakelin 230 Mass. 567, 120 N. E. 209 (1918), but
cf. Nash v. Fidelity Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. 106 W. Va. 672, 146 S. E. 726 (1929),
or letters intercepted by third parties, Cf. People v. Hayes, 140 N. Y. 484, 35 N.
